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SON OF BOSS AND THE TROUBLING LEGACY OF
COLONY, INC. V COMMISSIONER
Matthew Roche+
"Income tax has made more liars out of the American people than golf."'
The 1990s saw a surge in the tax shelter industry. 2  Because the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) initial review of a tax return is based on self-
disclosure, 3 and because of the complexity of many tax shelters, these schemes
go largely undetected by IRS auditors until after the Internal Revenue Code's
(I.R.C.) statute of limitations expires.4  The I.R.C.'s limitations period has
generated renewed attention in the tax-law community.5 This attention is due
to recent litigation between promoters of tax shelters, taxpayers who used tax
shelters to hide income, and the Treasury and Justice Departments, which have
been aggressively campaigning against the use of partnerships in tax shelters.
6
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2000, St. Mary's College of Maryland. The author would like to thank Professors Karla
Simon and Norman Stein for their guidance and expertise. The author would also like to thank
his wife for her enormous patience and support. Finally, the author wishes to thank the editors
and staff of the Catholic University Law Review for all their hard work and dedication.
1. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Quotes, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=
1 10483,00.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2008) (quoting Will Rogers).
2. See Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, TAX
NOTES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 201, 202. A tax shelter can be understood to be an investment entered
into solely to produce a "paper" loss that lowers the investor's overall tax liability. Joe M.
Chambers, New Developments in the Fight Against Tax Shelters: Unethical Behavior Under Fire,
30 J. LEGAL PROF. 117, 117 (2006) (citing Pollack & Soled, supra, at 201). These investments or
similar transactions have "no economic purpose ... except to create losses to offset taxable
income." Id. Tax shelters and other noncompliance schemes cost the government an estimated
$290 billion each year. See Tom Herman, How to Fight the IRS: Audits Soar Among the Rich;
Taking the Tax Man to Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18-19, 2006, at B 1.
3. See Hale E. Sheppard, Only Time Will Tell: The Growing Importance of the Statute of
Limitations in an Era of Sophisticated International Tax Structuring, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453,
462 (2005).
4. See id ("[Catching non-compliant taxpayers] is a formidable task in the case of modem
tax-avoidance schemes that involve submitting to the IRS numerous tax and information returns
regarding multi-layer entities engaged in multi-party transactions in an attempt to obfuscate the
true source, amount and/or owner of the income.").
5. See id at 453.
6. See Lynnley Browning, Court Case Gives Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2005, at C1 [hereinafter Browning, Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients]; Lynnley
Browning, Court Papers Say A.1.G. Played Role in Tax Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at C6
[hereinafter Browning, A..1G. Played Role in Tax Shelter]; Lynnley Browning, Inquiry Into Tax
Shelters Widens Beyond Audit Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Browning,
Inquiry Into Tax Shelters]; Lynnley Browning, US. Judge Backs LR.S. Ruling Invalidating Tax
Shelter, Possibly Aiding U.S. Criminal Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter
Browning, U.S. Judge Backs I.R.S.]; Lynnley Browning, Wider Look at Tax Shelters Offered by
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These shelters usually involve a partnership's assumption of the partners'
financial obligations in order to create non-economic tax losses.
7
This Comment focuses on the statute of limitations in the context of a
notorious tax shelter, the Sales Option Bond Strategy, also known as the "Son
of Boss" tax shelter.8  A number of factors contribute to the infamous
reputation that Son of Boss shelters earned in the tax community, including the
sheer audacity of these transactions and the billions of dollars that participants
sought to hide. 9 Justice Department investigations revealed that a high number
of respected Americans bought into the shelters.1° Son of Boss shelters were
also promoted by some of the most prestigious accounting and law firms in the
country."
Under current law, a taxpayer may claim a loss as an income tax deduction
only if it is a "bona fide" loss that "reflects actual economic consequences.
' ' 2
Under the economic-substance doctrine, a tax loss will not be allowed as an
income tax deduction if it is deemed "fictitious," or if the loss "lacks economic
reality."'13 An artificial income tax deduction is precisely what the Son of Boss
Deutsche Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at C4 [hereinafter Browning, Wider Look at Tax
Shelters]; Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Treasury Issues Guidance on Partnership Abuses
(June 23, 2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js493.htm [hereinafter
Guidance on Partnership Abuses Press Release].
7. See Guidance on Partnership Abuses Press Release, supra note 6.
8. See Browning, Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients, supra note 6 ("The tax shelter in
question is known informally as Son of Boss, or sales option bond strategy.").
9. See, e.g., id. (noting an example in which $2.4 billion was shielded).
10. See id. Browning describes one list of the investors as a "who's who of rich
Americans." Id. Some of the investors identified include:
Edward S. Lampert, the hedge fund billionaire and chairman of Sears Holdings; Paul
and Maurice Marciano, the founders and co-chairmen of the Guess clothing company;
Gary C. Wendt, the former General Electric and Conseco executive; and Bill Simon Jr.,
who ran for governor of California in 2002....
Other big-name investors who bought the tax shelters through Presidio include
Lodwrick Cook, a founder of Global Crossing; Joseph P. Nacchio, the former chief
executive of Qwest Communications International; David Saperstein of Los Angeles, a
prominent investor in the Westwood One radio network; and J. Paul Reddam, the
founder of Ditech, a mortgage lender with billboards up and down the East Coast.
Id.
11. See Browning, Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients, supra note 6 (identifying KPMG and
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood as law firms providing legal "blessing" to Son of Boss shelters);
Browning, A.I.G. Played Role in Tax Shelter, supra note 6 (identifying American International
Group, BDO Seidman, and Sentinel Advisors as Son of Boss promoters); Browning, Inquiry Into
Tax Shelters, supra note 6 (discussing how promoting Son of Boss led one partner at the law firm
Jenkens & Gilchrist to bill "$93 million from 1999 through 2003," but eventually destroyed the
firm); Browning, Wider Look at Tax Shelters, supra note 6 (noting that "KPMG reached a $456
million deferred-prosecution agreement with prosecutors and admitted criminal wrongdoing over
four types of shelters," that were variations of Son of Boss).
12. I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761 [hereinafter Notice 99-59].
13. See Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. I1, 45 (2007) ("Transactions are
considered to have economic substance when 'imbued with tax-independent considerations, and
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tax shelter is designed to produce. 14 Son of Boss shelters involve the use of an
inflated basis 15 in partnership interests to create artificial losses in order to
offset unrelated capital gains. 16  The Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed the
... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features ... ' (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978))). The Federal Circuit explained the purpose of the economic substance
doctrine as:
ajudicial effort to enforce the statutory purpose of the tax code. From its inception, the
economic substance doctrine has been used to prevent taxpayers from subverting the
legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack
economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit. In this regard, the economic substance
doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction that are employed in circumstances
where the literal terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate purpose of the statute.
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also ACM
P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In order to be deductible, a loss must
reflect actual economic consequences sustained in an economically substantive transaction and
cannot result solely from the application of a tax accounting rule to bifurcate a loss component of
a transaction from its offsetting gain component to generate an artificial loss which,... is 'not
economically inherent in' the transaction."); Scully v. United States, 840 F.2d 478, 485-86 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("[Taxpayers] have not shown that they can establish any ...genuine economic
loss."); Shoenberg v. Comm'r, 77 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1935) ("[The Revenue Act] ... requires
such losses to be actual and real."); 26 C.F.R. § 1.165-1(b) (2007) ("Only a bona fide loss is
allowable. Substance and not mere form shall govern in determining a deductible loss."); Notice
99-59, supra note 12 ("An artificial loss lacking economic substance is not allowable.").
14. See Browning, Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients, supra note 6.
15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 161 (8th ed. 2004) (defining basis as "[t]he value
assigned to a taxpayer's investment in property and used primarily for computing gain or loss
from a transfer of the property"); see also I.R.C. § 1012 (2000) (defining basis of property not
involving partnerships as "the cost of such property"). Other explanations of basis involving
partnerships include the following:
Under the general rule, a partner's basis in a partnership is determined by his
contributions, distributive share of gains and losses, liabilities assumed and discharged,
and distributions received. Under an alternative rule, the determination is made on the
basis of the partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property
upon a termination of the partnership.
47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 432 (2007).
16. See Browning, Rare Look at Tax Shelter Clients, supra note 6 ("[Son of Boss] uses
complex partnership structures to produce artificial losses to offset capital gains."); see also
Guidance on Partnership Abuses Press Release, supra note 6 ("In one variation of a 'Son of Boss'
transaction, a taxpayer purchases and writes economically offsetting options and then purports to
create substantial positive basis by transferring those option positions to a partnership. On the
disposition [or sale] of the partnership interest, [or] the liquidation of the partnership ...the
taxpayer claims a tax loss, even though the taxpayer has incurred no corresponding economic
loss.").
In a typical Son of Boss transaction, a taxpayer purchases and writes (that is, sells) stock
options; the taxpayer then transfers the options to a partnership, thereby increasing his basis in the
partnership interest. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 [hereinafter Notice 2000-44].
For example,
a taxpayer might purchase call options [that is, the option to buy stock at a set price
before a specific date] for a cost of $1,000X and simultaneously write offsetting call
options [selling the option], with a slightly higher strike price but the same expiration
date, for a premium of slightly less than $1,000X.
2008]
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validity of the economic substance doctrine, and courts are now using this
doctrine to invalidate Son of Boss transactions.
17
The Son of Boss shelter and other similar tax shelters were declared abusive
tax shelter transactions and shut down by the IRS in 2000.18 In 2004, The IRS
issued a settlement offer to participants in the Son of Boss shelter, allowing
them a window of time to disclose their participation in the scheme and pay all
Id. Next, the taxpayer transfers the option positions to the partnership. Id The taxpayer then
claims his basis in the partnership interest is increased by the cost of the purchased call options
without also reducing the basis by the amount of the value of the taxpayer's obligations from the
written call options that were assumed by the partnership, and which is required under § 752(b) of
the Tax Code. 1d; see also I.R.C. § 752(b) (2000) ("Any decrease in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the
assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution
of money to the partner by the partnership."). In so doing, the taxpayer artificially inflates his
basis in the partnership interest. See Notice 2000-44, supra. Thus, the taxpayer claims to have "a
basis in the partnership interest equal to the cost of the purchased call options ... even though the
taxpayer's net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of the partnership
interest are nominal or zero." Id. With respect to the disposition of the partnership interest, the
taxpayer claims a $1,000 loss, even though the taxpayer has not incurred an actual economic loss.
Id. The claimed loss thus reduces his unrelated capital gains tax liability.
17. See Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1343 (disregarding for tax purposes a variant Son of Boss
transaction as lacking in economic substance). In Coltec, the Federal Circuit identified five
principles included in the economic substance doctrine:
First, ... the law does not permit the taxpayer to reap tax benefits from a transaction
that lacks economic reality....
Second, when the taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the taxpayer who bears the
burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance....
Third, the economic substance of a transaction must be viewed objectively rather
than subjectively....
Fourth, the transaction to be analyzed is the one that gave rise to the alleged tax
benefit....
Finally, arrangements with subsidiaries that do not affect the economic interest of
independent third parties deserve particularly close scrutiny.
Id. at 1355-57. In the first case to litigate the merits of Son of Boss, the Court of Federal Claims
used these five principles to hold that Son of Boss transactions lack economic substance. See
Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 14 ("In sum, this transaction's fictional loss, inability to realize a
profit, lack of investment character, meaningless inclusion in a partnership, and disproportionate
tax advantage as compared to the amount invested and potential return, compel a conclusion that
the spread transaction objectively lacked economic substance."). The verdict in Jade Trading
was met with a largely positive response in the tax community. See Lynnley Browning, Judge
Hands I.R.S. Victory in Tax Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2007, at Cl; Jesse Drucker, U.S.
Prevails in Tax-Shelter Battle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2007, at A3; see also Lee A. Sheppard,
Erroneous Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES, Jan. 14, 2008, at 260
(favorably contrasting Jade Trading with a recent Tax Court opinion that "knowingly
misapplied" the economic substance doctrine).
18. See Notice 2000-44, supra note 16 ("These arrangements purport to give taxpayers
artificially high basis in partnership interests and thereby give rise to deductible losses on
disposition of those partnership interests.").
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of their claimed losses plus a small penalty. 19 Taxpayers who did not comply
with the settlement offer were issued deficiency notices and tax assessments
disallowing all claimed losses plus maximum penalties.20 By 2005, the IRS
had collected more than $3.7 billion from taxpayers participating in the
settlement.
2 1
Taxpayers who did not participate in the settlement offer have sued the
IRS.22 These taxpayers assert that deficiency notices issued to them are
unenforceable because the government issued the notices after the I.R.C.'s
statute of limitations expired.23 Generally, I.R.C. § 6501(a) provides that after
a taxpayer has filed an income tax return, the IRS has three years from that
date to review the return and issue a deficiency notice to the taxpayer.2 4 I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) extends the limitations period to six years for tax returns
containing substantial omissions of income.25  An amount of income is
19. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Robust Response for Executive Stock Option
Initiative; Son of Boss Settlement Heading for $4 Billion (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=141014,00.html [hereinafter Son of Boss Settlement
Heading for $4 Billion Press Release].
20. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, IRS Collects $3.2 Billion from Son of Boss;
Final Figure Should Top $3.5 Billion (March 24, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=137095,00.html.
21. See Son of Boss Settlement Heading for $4 Billion Press Release, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007
WL 2209129, at *1, 4 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) (reviewing a challenge to the IRS notice that the
partnership was liable for taxes as a result of Son of Boss shelters).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 6501(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this
title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed .... For purposes of this
chapter, the term "return" means the return required to be filed by the taxpayer (and
does not include a return of any person from whom the taxpayer has received an item of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit).
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2000).
25. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) provides:
If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the
tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. For
purposes of this subparagraph-
(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means the total of
the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such
amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of
such sales or services; and
(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be
taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the
return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the
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considered substantially omitted if it exceeds 25% of the return's reported
gross income. 26  The issue for courts is whether the Son of Boss scheme
constitutes an omission, and thus whether the six-year limitations period
should apply.
Taxpayers cite to an almost fifty-year-old Supreme Court case, Colony, Inc.S• 27
v. Commissioner, for the proposition that overstated basis that produces
understated gain is not an omission of income, thus often barring the IRS from
28the extended limitations period. 8 In Colony, the IRS issued a tax deficiency
The section of the Tax Code specifying the limitations period for partnership tax returns are in
critical respects, identical. See I.R.C. § 6229(a), which provides:
[T]he period for assessing any tax ... with respect to any person which is attributable
to any partnership item (or affected item) for a partnership taxable year shall not expire
before the date which is 3 years after the later of-
(1) the date on which the partnership return for such taxable year was filed, or
(2) the last day for filing such return for such year (determined without regard
to extensions).
Id. § 6229(a).
When deciding a statute of limitations issue brought under § 6229, courts interpret it according
to § 6501. See AD Global Fund, LLC v. United States, 481 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The rationale underlying this construction is the belief that § 6229(a) does not "create an
independent statute of limitations" separate from § 6501. Id. Rather, § 6229(a) "unambiguously
sets forth a minimum period for assessments of partnership items that may extend the regular
statute of limitations in § 6501. Section 6501 explicitly provides that it applies to any tax
imposed by the title, which would include tax imposed for partnership items." Id.; see also
Andantech, L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding § 6229 limitations
period for assessing partnerships is controlled by § 6501); Grapevine Imps. Ltd. v. United States,
71 Fed. Cl. 324, 332 (2006); Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants and Specialties, L.P. v. Comm'r, 114
T.C. 533, 540-41 (2000) ("[S]ections 6229 and 6501 contain alternative periods within which to
assess tax with respect to partnership items, with the later-expiring-period governing in a
particular case.").
With respect to the substantial omission of income in partnership returns, I.R.C. § 6229(c)(2)
provides: "[i]f any partnership omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in its return, subsection (a)
shall be applied by substituting '6 years' for '3 years."' I.R.C. § 6229(c)(2). Courts also interpret
§ 6229(c) according to § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii). See Bakersfield Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm'r,
128 T.C. 207, 212 (2007) ("Although section 6229 does not repeat all of the terms and provisions
already set forth in section 6501, the precedents interpreting section 6501(e)(l)(A)(ii) have been
held equally applicable to section 6229(c)(2), and that principle is not disputed here.").
26. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1). The I.R.C. also extends the statute of limitations to six years
for tax returns involving omissions from, among other things, estate and gift taxes or excise taxes.
Id. Taxpayers who file false or fraudulent returns or willfully attempt to evade a tax are exempt
from the statute of limitations protection, and those returns may be audited at any time. Id
27. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
28. See id. at 29; see Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv- I 340-T-24MAP,
2007 WL 2209129, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) ("This case involves Brandon Ridge Partners'
petition for readjustment of partnership items under I.R.C. § 6226. Specifically, Brandon Ridge
Partners challenges a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment [(FPAA)] . .. that
the Internal Revenue Service... issued on February 22, 2006 regarding Brandon Ridge Partners'
tax year ending December 31, 1998."); Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505,
507 (2007) ("[P]laintiffs filed their complaint in this court for readjustment of partnership items
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claiming that the taxpayer had omitted income on its return by understating
gross profits on the sale of land after the taxpayer overstated its basis.29 The
issue before the Court was whether the tax assessments were barred by the
three-year limitations period contained in § 275(a) of the 1939 tax code, or
were made timely by the five-year limitations period provided by § 275(c), the
predecessor to 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e). 30 The Court agreed with the taxpayer that
the five-year limitations period was inapplicable where gross receipts had been
fully reported, even if gross income was substantially under-reported. 31 The
Court then stated in dicta that "we observe that the conclusion we reach is in
harmony with the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
"32
Unsure as to the clarity of the interpretive mandate issued by the Supreme
Court, lower courts searched for ways to distinguish or otherwise avoid
applying Colony's holding.33 The judiciary is currently divided on whether the
Court's holding in Colony remains applicable.34 With the recent surge in tax
shelter litigation, including approximately 750 remaining Son of Boss cases,
the unresolved issue of understated basis has gained renewed attention from
courts.
35
under section 6226(a) of the Code, requesting that the court either declare the FPAA invalid or,
alternatively, order defendant to reverse the adjustments set forth therein."); Bakersfield Energy
Partners, 128 T.C. at 210 ("Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
the FPAA was issued after the applicable period of limitations had expired. Petitioners contend
that overstatement of basis is not an omission from gross income for purposes of the extended
period of limitations under section 6501 (e)(1)(A) ... .
29. Colony, 357 U.S. at 30.
30. Id. at 29.
31. Id. at 33 ("[T]he statute is limited to situations in which specific receipts or accruals of
income items are left out of the computation of gross income.").
32. Id. at 37. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) has not changed significantly since 1954. See I.R.C. §
6501(e)(1)(A) (2000).
33. See Grapevine, 77 Fed. Cl. at 509 ("In the wake of Colony, a judicial debate erupted
.... [S]everal cases have questioned the continuing viability of Colony ... ").
34. Compare Grapevine, 77 Fed. Cl. at 510 ("[T]he Supreme Court's construction of the
1939 Code is precedential as to the 1954 version of section 6501(e)(1)(A), so as to bind this
court[] .... "), and Bakersfield Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 215 (2007) ("We
are unpersuaded by respondent's attempt to distinguish and diminish the Supreme Court's
holding in Colony"), with Brandon Ridge, 2007 WL 2209129, at *6 (limiting Colony's holding to
instances involving the sale of goods or services), and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79
Fed. Cl. 189, 200 (2007) (holding Colony applicable only where a taxpayer who "engaged in a
trade or business selling goods or services... 'omitted an income receipt ... ').
35. See Son of Boss Settlement Heading for $4 Billion Press Release, supra note 19
("About 750 taxpayers did not elect or did not qualify to participate in the Son of Boss settlement
offer. The IRS will continue to pursue these cases through audits and the normal litigation
process."). With respect to cases that were in active litigation, as of July 2005, the release stated,
"more than 100 Son of Boss cases are in court and the IRS expects the first case to go to trial by
early fall." Id.
2008]
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As a result of the national attention given to Son of Boss and other similar
tax shelters, Congress amended the I.R.C.'s existing tax shelter rules by
passing the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Act). 36 Among other things,
the Act codified Treasury Department regulations37 by categorizing tax shelters
as "listed transaction[s]" and expanded the statute of limitations requirements
for tax shelters by adding a new subsection to § 6501(c). 38  The new §
6501(c)(10) provides that the limitations period for assessments of returns
where the taxpayer fails to disclose a listed transaction will not expire before
one year after the earlier of the date that either the taxpayer or his "material
advisor" discloses information about the listed transaction.39  The Treasury
Department has since identified the Son of Boss tax scheme and other similar
transactions that use an artificially high basis to generate non-economic losses
as impermissible "listed transaction[s]. ' 40
Two concerns have developed from the new regulations of listed
transactions. First, the authority allocated to the Treasury Department to
combat tax shelters seems to have shut the door on the continued use of Son of
Boss transactions. However, the regulations do not address the potential
problem of other situations involving inflated basis that may not qualify as a
listed transaction. Second, the new § 6501(c)(10) "is effective [only] for
taxable years with respect to which the limitations period on assessments did
not expire prior to October 22, 2004. "41 In other words, the new limitations
period for listed transactions "does not revive" an expired limitations period.
This is important because approximately 750 taxpayers either chose not to
participate in the Son of Boss settlement offer, or they did not qualify to
36. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 6501 (Supp. V 2005)).
37. Notice 2000-44, supra note 16.
38. Id.
39. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (Supp. V 2005). The new limitations period for listed
transactions provides:
If a taxpayer fails to include on any return or statement for any taxable year any
information with respect to a listed transaction (as defined in section 6707A(c)(2))
which is required under section 6011 to be included with such return or statement, the
time for assessment of any tax imposed by this title with respect to such transaction
shall not expire before the date which is 1 year after the earlier of-
(A) the date on which the Secretary is furnished the information so required, or
(B) the date that a material advisor meets the requirements of section 6112 with
respect to a request by the Secretary under section 6112(b) relating to such
transaction with respect to such taxpayer.
Id.
40. See Notice 2000-44, supra note 16 ("Transactions that are the same as or substantially
similar to the transactions described in this Notice 2000-44 are identified as 'listed transactions'
for the purposes of§ 1.6011-4T(b)(2) of the Temporary Income Tax Regulations and § 301.6111-
2T(b)(2) of the Temporary Procedure and Administration Regulations.").
41. See Rev. Proc. 2005-26, 2005-1 C.B. 965.
42. Id.
[Vol. 58:263
The Call to Amend § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Tax Code
participate in the settlement offer.43 As of the fall of 2005, more than 100 of
the 750 Son of Boss cases were in the beginning stages of litigation.
44
Litigation also remains an option for the hundreds of other cases that the IRS
has identified.45 All of these cases will be brought under the pre-2004 tax code
46amendments and are subject to the Supreme Court's holding in Colony.
More importantly, in the first Son of Boss case to be fully litigated in
December 2007, the Court of Federal Claims held that a Son of Boss
transaction lacked economic substance.4 7 Consequently, because of the
hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, whether Colony may render the
limitations period in § 6501(e)(1)(A) inapplicable is now a critical issue for
many remaining cases.48 The IRS has indicated that "[t]he disparity in results
among various courts ...may lead to additional litigation on this issue.
' 49
Both the govemment and taxpayers who lost statute of limitations claims have
appealed to the Federal and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.5 ° The outcomes
of those cases will likely determine the outcome of the hundreds of pending
cases.
This Comment will consider whether the Supreme Court's holding in
Colony precludes courts from treating overstated basis in a partnership's tax
return as an omission of gross income when Son of Boss tax deficiencies were
issued after the Tax Code's statute of limitations. First, this Comment will
explore the facts and circumstances underlying the Supreme Court's holding in
Colony, paying particular attention to the Court's conclusion that its analysis of
§ 275(c) of the 1939 Tax Code was in harmony with § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the
1954 Code. Second, this Comment will examine and compare the various
approaches lower courts have taken when applying Colony's holding. Third,
this Comment will argue that lower courts should not be bound by Colony
because of recent amendments to the Tax Code. This Comment will then
establish that § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s adequate disclosure standard will often
permit the statute's longer limitations period. Next, this Comment will
examine the new statute of limitations period for listed transactions passed
under the American Jobs Creation Act. Finally, this Comment will conclude
43. See Son of Boss Settlement Heading for $4 Billion Press Release, supra note 19. More
than 1200 taxpayers participated in the Son of Boss settlement offer. Id
44. Id.
45. See id
46. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
47. See Jade Trading, L.L.C. v United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 14 (2007).
48. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
49. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: IRS, MOST LITIGATED
ISSUES, 564 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007_vol_1_mostlitigated.
pdf.
50. See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007), argued, No. 2008-5053
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2008); Bakersfield Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207 (2007),
appeal docketed, No. 07-74275 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2007).
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that Congress should amend § 6501(e)(1)(A) to include overstated basis as a
method of omitting income.
1. COLONY AND ITS PROGENY
A. Understanding Colony
1. An Inauspicious Beginning: The Tax Court Decides that a Kentucky Real
Estate Venture Omitted Income by Overstating Basis
The Supreme Court's decision that overstated basis is not an omission of
gross income has its roots in a case that involved neither tax shelters nor
allegations of deception or fraud.5' In Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court upheld deficiency notices issued to Colony, Inc., a company that
developed and sold real estate lots in the suburbs of Lexington, Kentucky.
52
The dispute involved deficiency notices issued against Colony's 1946 and
1947 tax returns after the normal three-year statute of limitations period (under
the 1939 Tax Code) had expired.53
The Tax Court sustained the IRS's determination that Colony's return for
1946 and 1947 improperly included overstated development costs in its
calculation of the basis for the lots.54 Applying § 275(c) of the 1939 Tax Code,
51. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 30 (1958) ("There was no claim that the
taxpayer had inaccurately reported its gross receipts .... There was no claim that the returns
were fraudulent.").
52. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 30, 31 (1956), aft'd, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957),
rev'd, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
53. Id. at 41. Colony's tax return for the tax year ending October 31, 1946 was mailed on
January 15, 1947. Id. Its return for the tax year ending October 31, 1947 was mailed on
December 22, 1947. See id. The IRS mailed deficiency notices for Colony's 1946 and 1947 tax
returns more than six years later, on March 29, 1954. Id. Normally this would have been well
beyond the standard three-year limitations period contained in the 1939 Code. See I.R.C. §
275(a) (1939) ("General Rule. The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall be
assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without
assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period.").
However, pursuant to § 276(b) of the 1939 Code, on October 17, 1951, the taxpayers in Colony
entered into the first of three agreements with the IRS that eventually extended the limitations
period for assessing their 1946 return until June 30, 1954. Colony, 26 T.C. at 41. Similarly, for
its 1947 return, on May 14, 1952, the limitations period was mutually extended twice until June
30, 1954. Id. Because both extensions occurred "more than 3 years and less than 5 years after
the returns were filed," the Tax Court had to resolve "whether the 5-year statute of limitations
contained in section 275(c) of the 1939 Tax Code [was] applicable." Id. at 48; see also I.R.C. §
275(c) ("Omission from gross income. If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount
properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income
stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax
may be begun without assessment, at any time within 5 years after the return was filed.").
54. Colony, 26 T.C. at 40. Specifically, the estimated development costs claimed by
Colony, which the IRS disallowed, included funds to construct a water supply system, payments
to utility companies, and the difference between Colony's estimated costs and amount actually
spent. Id. at 44.
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the court first held that the overstated basis resulted in understated gross
income exceeding 25% of gross income stated in Colony's returns.55
Turning to the statute of limitations, the Tax Court rejected Colony's
argument that § 275(c)'s longer limitations period was inapplicable "because
the omission resulted from an overstatement of cost of goods sold, rather than
from an omission of gross receipts. 56 The court held that § 275(c)'s phrase
"omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein" includes not
only an omission of gross receipts or an item of income, but also understated
gross income as a result of overstating cost or basis.
57
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision.58 In a brief
opinion, the court noted that the alleged deficiency was "an erroneous
overstatement of the basis of land sold, rather than from any omission of gross
receipts." 59 The court initially suggested it might agree with the taxpayer's
argument that the § 275(c) five-year limitations period was inapplicable,
especially because this argument was supported by "considerable persuasive
force" from other circuits. However, the court ultimately chose to follow its
previous holding in Reis v. Commissioner,6 1 "where it was held that the five-
year limitation was applicable when the taxpayer's understatement of gross
income of more than twenty-five per cent was the result of his overstatement of
the cost basis of property sold."62 Upon the Sixth Circuit's affirmation, Colony
was appealed to the Supreme Court.
2. The Supreme Court Finds Zen-like Harmony with the 1954 Tax Code
When Colony reached the Supreme Court, it was reversed.64 Writing for the
majority, Justice Harlan focused on § 275(c)'s use of the word "omit."
65
Stating that the statute's words are "presumed to be used in their ordinary and
55. Id. at 40 ("[P]etitioner omitted from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which was in excess of 25 per cent of the amount of gross income stated in its returns.").
56. Id. at 48-49.
57. Id at 48 n. 1. The court concluded, "[o]n the basis of the Gibbs and Goodenow cases, it
is held that the 5-year statute of limitations in section 275(c) is applicable, and that the
deficiencies determined ... are not barred by the statute of limitations." Id. at 49 (citing
Goodenow v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1 (1955); Estate of J.W. Gibbs, Sr. v. Comm'r, 21 T.C. 443
(1954)).
58. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 244 F.2d 75, 76 (6th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) ("[T]he
decision of the Tax Court is affirmed."), rev'd, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 142 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1944).
62. Colony, 244 F.2d at 76 ("The facts in the Reis case are, of course, not identical with the
facts in the present case, but the issue presented is the same.").
63. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
64. Id. at 31, 38.
65. See id. at 32 ("In determining the correct interpretation of § 275(c) we start with the
critical statutory language, 'omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein."').
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usual sense," 66 the Court explained that "omit" is commonly defined as, "[t]o
leave out or unmentioned; not to insert, include or name.",67 The Court then
agreed with the taxpayer's argument that § 275(c) is "limited to situations in
which specific receipts or accruals of income items are left out of the
computation of gross income." 68 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Harlan
discussed textual ambiguities, 69 such as Congress's use of the word "amount"
rather than "item" in the context of an omission of gross income.
70
The Court turned to the statute's legislative history to resolve the
ambiguity. 71 Justice Harlan concluded that the legislative history provided
"persuasive evidence that Congress was addressing itself to the specific
situation where a taxpayer actually omitted some income receipt or accrual in
his computation of gross income, and not more generally to errors in that
computation arising from other causes.' '72 To support this interpretation, the
Court quoted the House Report accompanying the statute's enactment. 73 The
House Report stated, "[i]t is not believed that taxpayers who are so negligent
as to leave out of their returns items of such magnitude should be accorded the
privilege of pleading the bar of the statute." 74 Justice Harlan also explained
66. Id. (citing DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 (1919)).
67. Id. at 32 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)).
Further, the Court noted, "the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has elsewhere similarly
defined the word." Id. at 33 (citing Ewald v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1944)).
68. Id. at 33 (emphasis added) ("For reasons stated below we agree with the taxpayer's
position.").
69. Id. at 32-33 ("Although we are inclined to think that the statute on its face lends itself
more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation, it cannot be said that the language is
unambiguous.").
70. See id. at 32. The Court noted the significance of the word "amount" in the tax code:
The Commissioner states that the draftsman's use of the word "amount" (instead of, for
example, 'item') suggests a concentration on the quantitative aspect of the error-that
is, whether or not gross income was understated by as much as 25%. This view is
somewhat reinforced if, in reading the above-quoted phrase, one touches lightly on the
word "omits" and bears down hard on the words "gross income," for where a cost item
is overstated, as in the case before us, gross income is affected to the same degree as
when a gross-receipt item of the same amount is completely omitted from a tax return.
Id.
71. Id. at 33-34.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id. at 34.
74. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 35 (1934). The Court explained the legislative history as
follows:
Section 275(c) first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 680. As
introduced in the House the bill simply added the gross-income provision to § 276 of
the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, relating to fraudulent returns and cases where
no return had been filed, and carried with it no period of limitations. The intended
coverage of the proposed provision was stated in a Report of a House Ways and Means
Subcommittee as follows:
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that when the Senate Finance Committee approved the House version of § 275,
the Committee "believed the statute of limitations should not be kept open
indefinitely in the case of an honest but negligent taxpayer.",75 Because the
only significant change to earlier provisions of the statute of limitations on tax
assessments was the five-year limitations period, the Court reasoned that this
"reflect[ed] no change in the original basic objective underlying its
enactment. 76
The Court also rejected the Government's other two arguments, which
would favor the IRS by extending the limitations period applicable to
omissions resulting from understated gross income.77 First, the Government
stressed Congress's use of the phrase "understates gross income" in § 275.78
However, the Court downplayed the force of this phrase,79 asserting that this
"Section 276 provides for the assessment of the tax without regard to the statute
of limitations in case of a failure to file a return or in case of a false or fraudulent
return with intent to evade tax."
"Your subcommittee is of the opinion that the limitation period on assessment
should also not apply to certain cases where the taxpayer has understated his gross
income on his return by a large amount, even though fraud with intent to evade tax
cannot be established. It is, therefore, recommended that the statute of limitations
shall not apply where the taxpayer has failed to disclose in his return an amount of
gross income in excess of 25 percent of the amount of the gross income stated in
the return. The Government should not be penalized when a taxpayer is so
negligent as to leave out items of such magnitude from his return."
This purpose of the proposal was related to the full Committee in the following
colloquy between Congressman Cooper of Tennessee, speaking for the Subcommittee,
and Mr. Roswell Magill, representing the Treasury:
"Mr. Cooper. What we really had in mind was just this kind of a situation:
Assume that a taxpayer left out, say, a million dollars; he just forgot it. We felt
that whenever we found that he did that we ought to get the money on it, the tax on
it.
"Mr. Magill. I will not argue against you on that score.
"Mr. Cooper. In other words, if a man is so negligent and so forgetful, or
whatever the reason is, that he overlooks an item amounting to as much as 25
percent of his gross income, that we simply ought to have the opportunity of
getting the tax on that amount of money."
Colony, 357 U.S. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
75. Colony, 357 U.S. at 35. Justice Harlan quoted from the relevant Senate Report:
Your committee is in general accord with the policy expressed in this section of the
House bill. However, it is believed that in the case of a taxpayer who makes an honest
mistake, it would be unfair to keep the statute open indefinitely. For instance, a case
might arise where a taxpayer failed to report a dividend because he was erroneously
advised by the officers of the corporation that it was paid out of capital or he might
report as income for one year an item of income which properly belonged in another
year. Accordingly, your committee has provided for a 5-year statute in such cases.
Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-558, at 43-44 (1934)).
76. Id. at 35.
77. Id. at 35-36.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Id.
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language is "diluted" where the term "understates gross income" is used in
conjunction with the terms "failed to disclose" or "leaves out items of
income. ' 8° Next, the Government argued that the purpose of § 275(c) was to
extend the limitations period "where returns contained relatively large errors
adversely affecting the Treasury."81  The Court rejected the premise that the
statute's primary concern was the "mere size of the error," given that the
statute does not provide for errors in calculating total net taxable income.
82
Instead, the Court held that the legislative history manifests Congress's intent
that the extended limitations period applies only where an item of income was
entirely omitted from a return. 83 The Court concluded that:
We think that in enacting § 275(c) Congress manifested no broader
purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two years [now
three years] to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a
taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner
is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors. In such instances the
return on its face provides no clue to the existence of the omitted
item. On the other hand, when, as here, the understatement of a tax
arises from an error in reporting an item disclosed on the face of the
return the Commissioner is at no such disadvantage. And this would
seem to be so whether the error be one affecting "gross income" or
one, such as overstated deductions, affecting other parts of the
return.
84
Finally, in a passing comment that would haunt lower courts attempting to
interpret future versions of the Tax Code, the Court concluded that "the
conclusion we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous language of [§]
6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 .8 The Court thought it
80. See id ("The force of [the government's] contention is much diluted, however, when it
is observed that wherever this general language is found its intended meaning is immediately
illuminated by the use of such phrases as 'failed to disclose' or 'to leave out' items of income."
(citing Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 204 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1953))).
81. Id. at 36.
82. Id. ("[I]f the mere size of the error had been the principal concern of Congress, one
might have expected to find the statute cast in terms of errors in the total tax due or in total
taxable net income. We have been unable to find any solid support for [this] theory .... ).
83. Id. ("[T]his history shows to our satisfaction that the Congress intended an exception to
the usual three-year statute of limitations only in the restricted type of situation already
described.").
84. Id.
85. Id. at 37. When Congress replaced the 1939 Tax Code in 1954, the 1954 version
changed several provisions in § 275(c). Specifically, the 1954 Tax Code stated:
(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means the total of the
amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are
required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or
services; and
(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken
into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such
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was doing no more than "noting the speculative debate between the parties as
to whether Congress manifested an intention to clarify or to change the 1939
Code" when Congress enacted § 6501 (e)(1)(A) of the 1954 Code.
86
amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner
adequate to apprise the Secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount of such item.
I.R.C. §§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1954). The accompanying House and Senate reports shed light
on the drafters' reasoning. For instance, the House Report states:
Several changes from existing law have been made in subsection (e) of this section.
In paragraph (1), which relates to income tax, the existing 5-year rule in the case of an
omission of 25 percent of gross income has been extended to 6 years. The term gross
income as used in this paragraph has been redefined to mean the total receipts from the
sale of goods or services prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services. A
further change from existing law is the provision which states that any amount as to
which adequate information is given on the return will not be taken into account in
determining whether there has been an omission of 25 percent.
H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A414 (1954). The Senate Report contains identical language. See S.
REP. No. 83-1622, at 584-85 (1954).
86. Colony, 357 U.S. at 37. The Court's interpretation of § 275 was not without support
among the circuits. As the Court noted in its conclusion:
[O]ur construction of § 275(c) accords with the interpretations in the more recent
decisions of four different Courts of Appeals. The force of the reasoning in these
opinions was recognized by the Court of Appeals in the present case, which indicated
that it might have agreed with those courts had the matter been res nova in its circuit.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Goodenow v. Comm'r, 238 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 1956)
(holding that overstatement of inventory resulting in understatement of gross profits does not
constitute an "omission" of gross income under § 275(c)); Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d 549, 553
(5th Cir. 1956) (holding that there is no § 275(c) omission of income where understatement of
reported income results from a "difference between [the taxpayer] and the Commissioner as to the
legal construction to be applied to a disclosed transaction"); Slaff v. Comm'r, 220 F.2d 65, 68
(9th Cir. 1955) (holding that a taxpayer did not omit income when his tax return disclosed the full
amount of income earned overseas, but erroneously claimed a tax exemption for income earned
overseas); Deakman-Wells Co. v. Comm'r, 213 F.2d 894, 897 (3d Cir. 1954) ("[Section 275(c)]
applies only where the taxpayer has failed to make a return of some taxable gain, where he has
altogether omitted an item from the income reported, and not to a case . . . where he merely
understates the final figure in his gross income computation, the item in question having been
disclosed in the return but eliminated in the computation of the final figure."); Uptegrove Lumber
Co. v. Comm'r, 204 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that because § 275(c)'s extended
limitations period applies "only to situations where the taxpayer ... failed to make a return of
some taxable gain," the normal limitations period for assessments is applicable where a tax return
accurately disclosed gross sales but understated gross income because of erroneous deduction);
Lazarus v. Comm'r, 142 F. Supp. 897, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ("The courts have, we think rightly,
refused to give the Government the benefit of the exception if in fact the income in question is
shown on the return, though it is omitted in arriving at the amount shown on the return as gross
income.").
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B. Colony's Wake: Courts Adopt Three Approaches to Colony
1. Avoiding Colony: § 6501(e)(J)(A)(ii) 's Adequate-Disclosure Test and
Sherlock Holmes's Search for a Clue
The application of § 6501(e)(l)(A)(ii) in light of Colony was considered by
the Fifth Circuit in Phinney v. Chambers.87 In Phinney, the court was asked to
consider the timeliness of an assessment made to a widow's tax return that had
been prepared and filed by a local bank in its role as executor to the widow's
deceased husband's estate. 88 The controversy involved Ruth Chambers's 50%
ownership of a $795,957.73 note for stock that she and her husband had
previously sold under an installment plan. 89 Shortly after the note was paid in
full, Mrs. Chambers's tax return was prepared and filed by the bank along with
the return for her husband's estate.90 For the estate's return, the bank reported
the $375,736.07 in cash proceeds from the note along with $318,904.79 listed
as the reported gain from the sale. 91  However, with respect to Mrs.
Chambers's Tax Form 1040, the bank listed the stock's sales price as
$375,736.06, and it also listed its basis as $375,736.06, with a reported gain or
loss of zero.
92
When the IRS issued its assessment of Mrs. Chambers's return after the
normal three-year limitations period expired but within the six-year period, she
argued that the extended period was inapplicable under § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)
because the statute's adequate disclosure test was met. 93 Further, the bank
maintained that Colony rendered any inquiry into the adequacy of the return's
disclosure unnecessary because "so long as the gross amount reported was not
in error, there was no omission of 'an amount' from the return at all.",
94
Applying the Supreme Court's holding in Colony, in light of §
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) of the 1954 Code, the court held that when Congress enacted
subsection (ii), it intended the longer limitations period to apply either when an
item of income is totally omitted from a return, or when a return "misstat[es]
the nature of an item of income which places the 'commissioner... at a special
87. 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968).
88. Id. at 682.
89. Id. at 681 (indicating that the widow's half-interest in the note was $397,978.87).
90. Id. at 681-82.
91. Id. at 682.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 683. Mrs. Chambers maintained the disclosure of income was adequate because:
(1) the return listed the amount of gross income received from the stock's sale; (2) the amount
was reported as a "sale of stock," acquired on the day Mrs. Chambers' husband died; and (3) the
stock's basis equal to the sales price meant that, "even if there was [an omission], there was ...
disclosure 'in a manner adequate to apprise the secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount
of such item."' Id.
94. Id. at 685.
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disadvantage in detecting errors."' 95 Focusing on the drafter's choice of the
word "amount," the court reasoned that if a return facially discloses an item of
income "that is not shown in a manner sufficient to enable [an IRS agent] by
reasonable inspection of the return to detect the errors" then that item will
constitute an "omission of 'an amount' properly includable in the return."
96
Applying its construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) to Mrs. Chambers's return, the
court concluded that the disclosures in the return were insufficient to meet this
test, and therefore the six-year limitations period should apply.
97
In CC & F Western Operations Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner, the First
Circuit construed § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s adequate disclosure standard to apply
"where the taxpayer omitted a particular income item from its calculations but
disclosed it in substance." 98  There, the taxpayer used inflated basis and a
massive debt payment from the sale of partnershi interests to create an
artificial loss in "a complicated two-step transaction."
CC & F Western Operations Limited Partnership (Western) was formed in
1990.100 The two principal partners involved were CC & F Investment
Company (CC & F Investment) and CC & F Investors Inc. (CC & F
Investors). I They incorporated Western in order to aid the sale of partnership
interests owned by CC & F Investment to Trammell Crow Equity Partners II,
Ltd. (Trammell Crow). °2 The interests included an 84% general partnership
interest in seven real estate partnerships (the other 16% were retained by
separate partnerships comprised of CC & F employees) and complete
ownership interests in five tracts of land.'0 3  Before the sale, CC & F
Investment sold Western its interest in seven real estate partnerships. It also
conveyed the five land parcels to five new partnerships, 105 giving Western a
99% ownership interest in the five new partnerships. 0 6 In the spring of 1990,
95. Id. (emphasis added) ("[W]e think the following language of the [C]ourt's opinion in
Colony should control here: 'We think that in enacting Section 275(c)... Congress manifested no
broader purpose than to give the commissioner an additional 2 years ... to investigate tax returns
in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the commissioner is
at a special disadvantage in detecting errors."' (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 36
(1958))).
96. Id
97. Id. at 685-86 ("[T]here can be no substantial argument that the disclosure made by
[Mrs. Chambers'] return was 'adequate to apprise the Secretary or his delegate of the nature and
amount of such item."').
98. CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 408 (1st Cir. 2001).




103. Id. at 403-04.
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Western, along with CC & F Investors and its other employee partnerships,
sold all of their interests in all twelve partnerships to Trammell Crow.
10 7
Trammell Crow paid $74,122,212 in cash for the twelve partnerships. °8 As a
condition of the sale, the partnerships were to be conveyed debt free;
10 9
accordingly, $52,928,095 of the proceeds from the sale went directly to pay the
balance of Western's debt." 0
In its tax return for the 1990 tax year, Western did not disclose this
payment."' Rather, Western's return disclosed only that it sold "various
partnership interests" in March 1990 for a total price of $27,965,55 1.112
Without providing any explanation, the return also listed its basis as
$31,161,890, with a resulting net loss of $3,196,339.113 In addition, Western
attached to its return the Schedule K-Is taken from the twelve partnership
returns it sold to Trammell Crow. 14  The IRS determined that the debt
payment constituted undisclosed income, and that the basis had been
incorrectly calculated; therefore, the reported net loss really should have been a
net gain of $9,182,216.'15 The IRS eventually issued Western an adjustment to
its taxable income "a day less than six years after Western's return was
filed."' 16
In deciding whether § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) made the deficiency notice timely,
the court rejected Western's argument that the "aggregate of Western's
indebtedness, reflected in the twelve subsidiary partnerships' Schedule K-Is
that were attached to Western's own partnership return," disclosed enough
information for the IRS to determine whether an omission of income occurred











117. Id. at 407. The court summarized Western's argument that its adequate disclosure
burden was met as follows:
Western's argument as to adequate disclosure is that the Schedule K-Is of the twelve
partnerships specified figures representing Western's indebtedness immediately before
the sale in amounts that, if aggregated, approached $70 million. This, says Western,
should have alerted the IRS to a large amount of missing gross income because
Western had reported only $27 million as the "gross sales price" on its own return. If
the $70 million were treated as attributed income, the reported figure should have been
much higher.
Id. at 408. Before this argument was made however, the court determined that Trammell Crow's
"huge payment ... discharging Western's indebtedness to banks is properly treated as a gross
receipt and gross income attributable to Western." Id. at 406 (citing I.R.C. §§ 752(d), 1001(b)
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assuming the IRS was aware of the pre-sale debt, the government could not
reasonably infer that the balance of the debt was "paid off by Trammell Crow
incident to its purchase" of the partnerships." 8 The court pointed to the fact
that Western's return did not disclose or otherwise indicate the terms of the
sale or any debt allocation. 19  The court concluded that the "chain of
inferences relied upon by Western is simply too thin and doubtful" to satisfy §
6501(e)'s adequate disclosure test.'
20
The court refused to construe Justice Harlan's reference to returns that
provide the IRS with "no clue" as a "description of a condition for
implementing section 275. " 121 Instead, the court reasoned that Colony's
reference to a "clue" was to illustrate the distinction between an omitted
receipt and overstated basis: an omitted receipt implicitly shows no indication
of error, thereby putting the IRS at a disadvantage when reviewing a return.1
22
By contrast, an overstated basis is still disclosed in the return, which "provides
something the IRS can check.' ' 123 More importantly, the court argued that the
critical phrase, "adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount,"
contained in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii), "establishes a much stiffer test than a mere
clue, and quite properly the cases tend to interpret it as requiring far more than
a mere clue that might intrigue Sherlock Holmes."'
' 24
(2000); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.752-1(h), 1.1001-2(a) (2001)). The court concluded that "[aill or most of
this amount, stipulated as $52,928,095, was simply omitted as an income item on Western's
return." CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d at 406. This conclusion had a devastating
effect on Western's argument that Colony was "on all fours with this case," Id. Because
Western's return omitted income, the court held Colony was distinguishable:
Colony did not involve the failure to include attributed income; rather, all receipts were
disclosed and the taxpayer's only fault was an overstatement of basis .... In Colony
there was no such omission and that was decisive; here, there was. So much for any
argument that Colony is directly in point and that its outcome compels the same one
here.
Id.
118. CC &F W. Operations Ltd P'ship, 273 F.3d at408.
119. Id
120. Id
121. Id at 407. In doing so the court rebutted various Tax Court decisions that construed
Colony's clue reference to be an "independent test so that there must be both an omission of over
25 percent and also no clue to the existence of the omission." Id (citing Rhone-Poulenc
Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 533, 557-58 (2000), appeal dismissed and




124. Id. (citing George Edward Quick Trust v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1336, 1347 (1970), aff'dper
curiam, 444 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1971)). Interestingly, the court also used its argument that Colony
did not establish a "clue test" to again cast doubt on Colony's continued viability. See id ("The
use of the clue language in decisions construing section 6501's adequate disclosure provision
likely reflects an impulse to create a sense of continuity (unfortunately false) between Colony and
section 6501's adequate disclosure test." (emphasis added)).
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More recently, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, in Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, applied Colony in light of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii). 125  In Brandon Ridge Partners, the court applied §
6 501(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s adequate disclosure standard to a Son of Boss tax
scheme. 26 The case arose when, in 1998, Nelson Jefferson wanted to sell his
shares in Florida Electronic Supply, Inc. (FES). 12  At the time, Jefferson was
the majority shareholder in FES, and his stock had a low basis. 128  On
November 18, 1998, Jefferson formed two partnerships: NJ Investments, LLC,
with Jefferson having 100% partnership interest; and Brandon Ridge Partners,
with Jefferson owning a 99% partnership interest, and his wife Carolyn
Jefferson having a 1% interest.1 29 The next day, November 19, 1998, Jefferson
incorporated Brandon Ridge, Inc., an S-corporation that Jefferson owned
outright. 130
On November 24, 1998, NJ Investments (meaning Jefferson, with the
partnership acting as the submissive "pass-through" entity) entered into a short
sale of United States Treasury Notes (T-Notes), whereby the partnership
"borrowed" the T-Notes, then sold them to a third party at a higher price.
The court explained, "[w]hen one engages in a short sale, there is a
corresponding obligation following the sale to replace the borrowed security.
Typically, this is done by purchasing the security on the open market at some
later date and transferring it to the lending party." 132  The partnership
eventually sold the T-Notes for $3,258,458.33.'
On November 25, 2008, NJ Investments transferred to Brandon Ridge
Partners both the $3,258,458.33 in cash from the sale and the corresponding
obligation to cover the short sale.1 34 Brandon Ridge Partners covered the sale
two days later, on November 27, 1998.135 A few days later, on December 2,
1998, Jefferson conveyed his ownership of the FES stock to Brandon Ridge
Partners. 36 On December 3, 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson conveyed 99% of
125. Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL
2209129, at *10-11 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007). The court held that the "gain on the sale of the...
stock was not shown in a manner sufficient to enable the IRS, upon reasonable inspection, to
detect that it had been calculated incorrectly due to an overstatement in the basis ... which led to
an understatement of gross income by over $3 million." Id. at *7.
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their partnership interests in Brandon Ridge Partners to Brandon Ridge, Inc.'
37
Jefferson kept a 1% interest in Brandon Ridge Partners. 138  The court
summarized the transactions: "by December 3, 1998, Brandon Ridge, Inc. held
a 99% interest in Brandon Ridge Partners, which in turn held the FES stock.
Both Brandon Ridge Partners and Brandon Ridge, Inc. were controlled by the
Jeffersons."139
On December 3, 1998, Brandon Ridge Partners made a § 754 election to
adjust the basis of the FES stock, increasing it to $3,258,458.33. 14' On
December 4, 1998, Brandon Ridge Partners sold the stock for $3,315,000.141
The reported gain on the sale of the stock was $31,042.142 Brandon Ridge
Partners filed its 1998 tax return on September 13, 1999, which the IRS
received on October 5, 1999.143 After the three-year statute of limitations
period expired, the IRS then issued a Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustment (FPAA) to Brandon Ridge.144
In considering whether there was adequate disclosure in the Brandon Ridge
Partners' tax return, the court applied the reasonableness standard as explained
by the Fifth Circuit in Phinney: "[i]f an item of income is not shown on the
face of the return or an attached statement 'in a manner sufficient to enable the
[IRS] by reasonable inspection of the return to detect the errors,' then the item
is not adequately disclosed. 1 45  In considering what was disclosed on the
returns, the court honed in on what was undisclosed: while the returns reported
the FES stock and the stock's basis, the returns did not disclose (1) that the
137. Id. Under § 708 of the Tax Code, Brandon Ridge Partners underwent a "technical
termination" when the Jeffersons transferred their 99% partnership interest in that partnership to
Brandon Ridge Inc. Id. at *2 & n.4 ("Section 708(b)(I)(B) provides that if there is a sale or
exchange of 50% or more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits within a twelve
month period, the partnership is considered terminated.").
138. Id. at*2 n.3.
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id. I.R.C. § 754 provides:
If a partnership files an election, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, the basis of partnership property shall be adjusted, in the case of a
distribution of property, in the manner provided in section 734 and, in the case of a
transfer of a partnership interest, in the manner provided in section 743. Such an
election shall apply with respect to all distributions of property by the partnership and
to all transfers of interests in the partnership during the taxable year with respect to
which such election was filed and all subsequent taxable years. Such election may be
revoked by the partnership, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
I.R.C. § 754 (2000).




145. Id. at * 10 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Phinney v. Chambers, 392
F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968)).
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cash and obligation to cover the short sale was conveyed to the partnership; (2)
that the plaintiffs' basis in the partnership was not reduced by the dollar
amount of the obligation to cover the sale; and (3) that the basis of the FES
stock increased by $3,258,458.33. 146 The court concluded:
In order to adequately disclose the gain on the sale of the FES stock,
information regarding the contribution of the obligation to cover the
short sale and its effect on the basis of the Jeffersons' interest in the
Partnership (which was later transferred to Brandon Ridge, Inc.) was
necessary so that the IRS could detect the error in the calculation of
the net long-term capital gain on the sale of the FES stock.'
47
Consequently, because the Jeffersons' disclosures were inadequate, the court
applied the longer limitations period. 1
48
2. Limiting Colony to Its Holding: The Trade or Business Exception
Salman Ranch v. United States is a recent case by the Court of Federal
Claims addressing Son of Boss transactions under § 6501(e)'s statute of
limitations.1 49  The facts in Salman Ranch reflect a classic Son of Boss
transaction. Salman Ranch has its genesis in a series of partnership
transactions beginning with the formation of Salman Ranch, Ltd. in 1987."
0
Salman Ranch Ltd. was formed by the owners of Salman Ranch, operating in
New Mexico. 51 The partners included William J. Salman, David M. Salman,
Frances S. Koenig, the Frances D. Salman Testamentary Trust, and other
Salman and Koenig family members. 52 The ranch owners transferred their
interests in Salman Ranch in exchange for partnership interests in Salman
Ranch Ltd.'53
On December 30, 1998, the Salman Ranch partners laid the foundation for a
Son of Boss tax shelter by forming three limited partnerships, the William J.
Salman Family Limited Partnership, the David M. Salman Family Limited
Partnership, and the Frances S. Koenig Family Limited Partnership. 54 On
October 8, 1999, the Salman Ranch partners "entered into short sales of U.S.
Treasury Notes" yielding $10,982,373.155 One week later the partners
transferred the proceeds from the Treasury Notes, along with their obligation
146. Id.
147. Id. at *11; see also Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 204 (2007)
("The partnership returns and the partners' individual returns do not disclose the nature and
amount of the omitted gross income in a manner adequate to apprise the IRS.").
148. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at * 12.
149. Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 190.
150. See id at 190-91.
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to close on the short sale, to Salman Ranch Ltd. 56 Salman Ranch Ltd. then
closed the short positions for $10,980,866.'
About six weeks later, on November 30, 1999, the Salman Ranch partners
contributed, according to family membership, their partnership interests in the
ranch to the three new partnerships. 158  Consequently, "[e]ach family
partnership, with each of the respective family members as partners, now held
a partnership interest in Salman Ranch, which, in turn, held the ranch."'
159
Under Tax Code partnership provisions, the transaction caused a "technical
termination" of Salman Ranch Ltd. 16 In the final partnership tax return for the
taxable period ending November 30, 1999, the partners elected to raise their
basis in Salman Ranch Ltd. to $6,850,276. 161 Less than a month later, on
December 23, 1999, the partnership sold a part of the ranch for $7,088,588.162
Salman Ranch Ltd. filed its final tax return on April 16, 2000, reporting
$7,188,588 from the sale of the ranch, $6,850,276 in basis, and $338,312 in
taxable gain.
163
On April 10, 2006, the IRS issued a FPAA to the partnership, reducing the
partnership's basis in the ranch.164  The reduced basis increased the
partnership's capital gains from the ranch's sale by $4,567,949.'65 The Salman
Ranch partners sued the Government, claiming the treatment of overstated
basis by the Supreme Court in Colony and the governing statute of limitations
in § 6501(e)(1)(A) rendered the FPAA untimely!'
66
The Salman Ranch court adopted a new interpretation of Colony.16 7 Judge
Miller observed that although Justice Harlan described the Supreme Court's
holding in Colony as "in harmony with the unambiguous language of §
6501(e)(1)(A)," the opinion also asserted that the language, "omits from gross
income an amount properly includible therein," in § 275(c) of the 1939 tax
code "cannot be said [to be] unambiguous."'1 68 The court first explained that
156. Id.
157. Id. The court explained that a short position is "the obligation following the shortsale to
replace the borrowed securities." Id.
158. Id. at 191.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. ("The election to adjust the basis of partnership property purported to increase the
partners' basis in the ranch to a reported amount of $6,850,276.00, a step-up in basis reflecting
the original basis in the ranch, plus the value of the short-sale cash proceeds contributed to the
partnership."); see also I.R.C. §§ 743(b)(1), 754 (2000) (providing tax treatment for optional
adjustment to partnership property).
162. Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 190-91.
163. Id. at 191.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 190, 194.
167. See id. at 199.
168. Id. (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33, 37 (1958)).
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textually, both I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939) and I.R.C. § 6501(e)(l)(A) (2000)
contain the same language, "omits from gross income an amount properly
includible therein."'1 69  Judge Miller argued that, "as a matter of logical
consistency," the two versions "must differ in some respect" from each
other.' 70  The only significant difference between the two versions was the
"inclusion of the gross receipts and adequate disclosure provisions" in §
6501(e)(1)(A).' 7 1 Consequently, Judge Miller concluded that Justice Harlan's
statement that Colony's holding "is in harmony with the unambiguous
language of § 6501(e)(1)(A)," can only mean that its holding is "in harmony
with the addition of those two provisions."
172
Reviewing § 6501(e), the court concluded that the term "omit" must be
defined by referencing the term "gross income."'' 73 This construction requires
a court to review the nature of the taxpayer's business and the transaction
being litigated.' 74  A critical fact to the Salman Ranch court's analysis of
Colony was that the taxpayer in Colony was "engaged in the trade and business
of developing and selling real estate lots."' 75 Under the Tax Code, unless
otherwise provided for, trade or business gross income that is derived from the
sale of goods or services is calculated by "subtracting the 'Cost of Goods
Sold'... from the gross receipts of the sales."' 176 The court went on to contrast
the normal method of calculating trade or business income with the method
provided for in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i). Judge Miller concluded that the later
provision "provides an exception to the customary definition of gross income
in the event of sales of goods or services by a trade or business," because under
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), "gross income" is "defined as the 'gross receipts' alone of
those sales."' 177 Thus, under that provision, in order for a court to conclude that
a trade or business omitted income, an actual receipt from the sale of goods or
services must be omitted from the return. 78 When viewed under this light,
Judge Miller found Colony's requirement that "'specific receipts or accruals of
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 275(c) (1939); I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).
172. Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 199.
173. Id. at 200.
174. Id. at 199-200.
175. Id.
176. Id at 199 (citing In re Lilly, 76 F.3d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1996); Lawson v. Comm'r, 67
T.C.M. (CCH) 3121, 3121-23 (1994)). This interpretation is also supported by other Tax Court
cases. See, e.g., Schneider v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032, 1034 (1985) (determining that the
calculation of gross income is unaffected by capital loss). In determining that "gross income" in
§ 6501(e)(l)(A)(i) did not include the sale of a capital asset, the court stated: "Therefore, we must
look to the general definition of gross income to determine the proper treatment of non-business
gross income under [I.R.C. § 61 (1954)]." Id. The court concluded that § 61 precluded treating a
capital loss as gross income. Id.
177. Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 199.
178. Id.
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income items [should be] left out of the computation of gross income' in
order for an omission to occur under § 275(c) "makes eminent sense because
The Colony, Inc. was a trade or business selling goods or services.' 79
The court declined to interpret Colony's holding as standing for the
proposition that overstated basis cannot lead to an omission of gross income as
an "impermissibly broad rendering of the Colony holding."' 80  Such an
interpretation of Colony's holding renders "the gross receipts provision of
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) superfluous."18' Accordingly, Judge Miller
concluded that "[t]he term 'omit,' as used in section 275(c) and again in I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A), cannot be defined and understood without reference to the
qualifying term 'gross income' and, consequently, to the nature of the
taxpayer's business."'
' 82
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida reached a similar
conclusion in Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States.183 In Brandon Ridge
Partners, Judge Bucklew also limited Colony's gross receipts test to
circumstances involving the sale of actual goods or services, as set forth in §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i). 184 The court agreed with the Tax Court's holding that the
text of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) requires limiting Colony to trade or business sales of
goods or services.' 5 The court argued that "[t]o conclude otherwise would
179. Id. at 199-200 ("[Colony's] conclusion that The Colony, Inc. had not omitted any gross
income and thus was not liable under section 275(c) is 'in harmony with the unambiguous
language of [§] 6501(e)(1)(A),' in that the resolution would be the same under either provision.").
180. Id. at 200 ("[T]he Supreme Court did not set forth a general prescription for every
instance in which an omission of income may be contested.").
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
184. Id. at *6-7 ("[T]he phrase 'omits from gross income an amount properly includible
therein' encompasses not only situations where an item of income is completely left out, but also
situations where the amount of gross income is understated due to an error in the calculation
185. See id at *6; see also Schneider v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032, 1035 (1985)
("[W]e are convinced that Congress was simply changing for section 6501(e) purposes the
definition of trade or business gross income from the generally accepted definition that 'gross
income' means the total sales, less the cost of the goods sold .... '); Insulglass Corp. v. Comm'r,
84 T.C. 203, 209-10 (1985) (holding that § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)'s definition of income is exclusive to
income derived from a "trade or business," and "provides an exception ... to the general meaning
of 'gross income' as stated in section 6501(e). In the case of a trade or business, 'gross income'
is equated with gross receipts."). In Lawson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court explained that
Congress limited Colony's gross receipts test to sales of goods or services when it revised the Tax
Code in 1954:
However, with respect to taxable years beginning after August 17, 1954, Congress
had already resolved the problem addressed in Colony, Inc. v. Comm 'r by enacting
section 6501(e)(l)(A) of the 1954 Code. In that section Congress broadened the
definition of "gross income" to mean "total receipts from the sale of goods or services
prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services" and provided that "any amount
as to which adequate information is given on the return will not be taken into account in
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render § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) superfluous."' 86  The court also noted that §
6501(e)(2),' 87 which concerns estate and gift taxes, also extends the limitations
period to six years "when a 'taxpayer omits ... items includible in [the] gross
estate or [the] total gifts."" 88  However the language of both sections, which
are otherwise very similar, differ on key points. Section 6501(e)(2) states
"item[s]" in the context of an omission, whereas § 6501(e)(1) states
"amount." 89 In discussing Congress's use of the two terms, the court argued
that the distinction showed the drafter's intent that § 6501(e)(2)'s limitations
period is applicable only "when an item is completely left out."'1 90  By
comparison, the limitations period found in § 6501(e)(1) is applicable not only
when an item is left out, but also when "the amount of gross income reported is
understated."' 91
3. Complete Fidelity: Worshipping at the Altar of Colony
This question was taken up again by the Tax Court in Bakersfield Energy
Partners v. Commissioner.192 In Bakersfield, the IRS issued an FPAA after
concluding that the partners in Bakersfield Energy Partnership omitted income
determining whether there has been an omission of 25 percent." This special definition
of "gross income" was limited to interpretations of section 6501(e) and was not
intended to be applied outside of that section unless the Code otherwise provided.
Lawson v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. 3121, 3121-24 (1994) (citations omitted).
186. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *6. The court stated: "[F]or
nonbusiness items and those not covered under sec. 6501(e)(l)(A)(i), the general definition of
gross income found in the Code applies." Id. (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 101
T.C. 294, 299 n.7 (1993) (alteration in original)).
187. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2) addresses estate and gift taxes:
In the case of a return of estate tax under chapter 11 or a return of gift tax under
chapter 12, if the taxpayer omits from the gross estate or from the total amount of the
gifts made during the period for which the return was filed items includible in such
gross estate or such total gifts, as the case may be, as exceed in amount 25 percent of
the gross estate stated in the return or the total amount of gifts stated in the return, the
tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. In
determining the items omitted from the gross estate or the total gifts, there shall not be
taken into account any item which is omitted from the gross estate or from the total
gifts stated in the return if such item is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached
to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of
such item.
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2) (2000).
188. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7 (quoting I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2)
(alterations in original)).
189. See id; see also I.R.C. § 6501(e)(l)(A) ("If the taxpayer omits ... an amount ..
(emphasis added)); I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2) ("[l]f the taxpayer omits . . . items . (emphasis
added)).
190. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7.
191. Id.
192. 128 T.C. 207 (2007).
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from the sale of oil and gas property by overstating its basis by more than
$16.5 million.193  The taxpayer challenged the timeliness of the adjustment,
arguing that Colony precluded treating overstated basis as an omission of gross
income under § 6501(e). 194 The Government argued that the application of
gross income under § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) to a case not involving the sale of goods
or services would be a misapplication of Colony.'
95
In a stark departure from its previous holdings, the Tax Court flatly rejected
the Government's position. 196 The court held that "[w]e are unpersuaded by
[the Government's] attempt to distinguish and diminish the Supreme Court's
holding in Colony, Inc ...... We do not believe that either the language or the
rationale of Colony, Inc. can be limited to the sales of goods or services by a
trade or business."' 97  The court then issued this brief explanation for its
holding, "[a]s petitioners point out, the Supreme Court held that 'omits' means
something 'left out' and not something put in and overstated.' 98
More recently, this issue was taken up in the United States Court of Federal
Claims in Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States.199 Grapevine involved
Joseph and Virginia Tigue's formation of Grapevine Imports Ltd. in March,
1996."' Its 1999 Partnership return showed a net short term loss of
$21,884.201 The Tigues' individual tax return for 1999 showed a larger loss of
$973,087.202 The IRS issued the FPAA to T-Tech, Grapevine's tax matters
193. Id. at 208-10.
194. Id. at210.
195. See id at 214. The Government argued that "gross income" should instead be defined
according to its general definition in § 61 of the Tax Code. Id. The Government maintained that
"Colony[] does not provide any authority for treating gross receipt as gross income for the sale of
land or other property; rather, under the current [Tax Code], that treatment depends on whether
the property sold is a good or service." Id. at 215. The Government sought to distinguish Colony
from the facts of this case:
[I]n Colony, Inc., the Supreme Court had before it a case of a sale of goods or services,
as the taxpayer's principal business was the development and sale of lots in a
subdivision. In cases not concerning a sale of goods or services, Colony, Inc.'s
approach would conflict with I.R.C. sec. 6501(e)(l)(A). See CC & F Western
Operations L.P., 273 F.3d at 406, in which the First Circuit questions whether Colony's
main holding carries over from the 1939 Internal Revenue Code for land sales in
general ("Gross income on land sales is normally computed as net gain after subtracting





199. 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 510 (2007) ("The question here, of course, is whether the Supreme
Court's construction of the 1939 Code is precedential as to the 1954 version of section
6501 (e)(1)(A), so as to bind this court's construction of the latter.").
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partner,203 on December 17, 2004, after expiration of the three-year limitations
period.20 4 The issue before the court was whether section 6501(e)'s extended
limitations period was applicable.
20 5
After a careful discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Colony, Judge
Allegra concluded that § 6501(e)(1)(A)'s extended limitations period was
inapplicable, and thus the 1999 assessment was barred by the normal three-
year statute of limitations. 206  Judge Allegra discussed three reasons for
concluding that Colony was applicable to the post-1954 Tax Code.
20 7
First, the meaning of "omits" applies to the 1954 Tax Code with as much
force as it did the 1939 Code, "for, in both, that word is pivotal. 20 8 The court
observed that the "plain meaning" of "omits," which the Supreme Court
understood to mean an entire income item was missing, did not change
between 1939 and 1954.209
Second, Judge Allegra challenged the conclusion reached by other courts
that Congress intended a different construction of § 275(c) when it passed the
1954 Code.210 The court noted, "any notion that Congress altered the meaning
of the statute in 1954 is belied ... by its failure to modify the word 'omits
203. Id. Judge Allegra explained the term of tax matters partner:
Under section 6231 (a)(7) of the Code, the "tax matters partner," or TMP, generally is
either "the general partner designated as the tax matters partner as provided in the
regulations" or if no such partner has been designated, "the general partner having the
largest profits interest in the partnership at the close of the taxable year involved." For
a fuller discussion of the partnership audit provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (TEFRA), see Keener v.
United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 455, 458-59 (2007).
Id. at 507 n. 1.
204. Id. at 507. The court further noted that the following spring Joseph Tigue, "as the sole
owner of T-Tech, . . . remitted deposits of $1,594,205 and $221,170 for tax years 1999 and 2000,
respectively, in accordance with section 6226 of the Code." Id.
205. Id. at 507.
206. Id. at 506, 510-12.
207. See id. at 510-11. The court explained:
As the Federal Circuit recently reminded, "[t]here can be no question that the Court of
Federal Claims is required to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court, our court, and
our predecessor court, the Court of Claims," adding that this rule applies even if the
"decisions of the Supreme Court have been eroded."
Id. at 510 (citing Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). The
court referred to its 1998 decision in Hohn v. United States, "[o]ur decisions remain binding
precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised
doubts about their continuing vitality." Id. (citing Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53
(1998)).
208. Id. at510.
209. Id. In a footnote, Judge Allegra noted that the meaning of omit has not changed since
1934. Id at 510 n.6.
210. Id. at510-11.
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.... ,,,211 Furthermore, Judge Allegra argued that the Supreme Court's now
infamous passing statement that the 1954 Tax Code is "in harmony" with the
unambiguous language of the 1939 Tax Code has not been overturned or
modified, and thus is still binding precedent.
212
Third, Judge Allegra explained his disagreement with those courts that have
limited Colony:213 ,this court sees no basis for limiting the Supreme Court's
decision to cases involving the sale of goods or services by a trade or
business." 214  Judge Allegra then explained his disagreement with a narrow
application of Colony, because "neither the Supreme Court's construction of
the word 'omits,' its examination of the legislative history, nor the remainder
of its ratio decendi reasonably can be confined to that setting."
21 5
C. Congress Weighs In: The American Jobs Creation Act
In 2004 Congress amended the I.R.C.'s existing anti-tax shelter provisions
216when it passed the American Jobs Creation Act. The amendments tightened
the rules relating to tax shelters by replacing the existing tax shelter
registration regime with a disclosure regime that is supported by stiff penalties
for tax shelter participants.2 17  The amendments codified prior Treasury
regulations 18 for tax shelters and other tax avoidance transactions deemed by
regulators to be "reportable [or] listed transactions. 21 9 Generally, the Code
211. Id at 510. Interestingly, Judge Allegra used this opportunity to hint that he disagreed
with the Supreme Court's statutory construction in Colony. He wrote, "one might disagree with
the latter observation [of Justice Harlan's "in harmony" statement], but ultimately it leaves little
room for this court to conclude that the modifications made in 1954, by adding sections
6501 (e)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), somehow altered the meaning of the preexisting base provision." Id. at
510-11.
212. Id. at510.
213. See id. at 511.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
217. See I.R.C. § 6011 (2000) (establishing disclosure requirements); id § 6662A (Supp. V
2005) ("Imposition of accuracy related-penalty on understatements with respect to reportable
transactions"); id. § 6707 (imposing penalties on material advisors for nondisclosure of reportable
transactions); id § 6707A (imposing penalties on participants of reportable transactions for
nondisclosure); id. § 6708 ("Failure to maintain lists of advisees with respect to reportable
transactions").
218. Notice 2000-44, supra note 16.
219. See I.R.C. § 6707A. The amendments authorize the Treasury Department to regulate
reportable and listed transactions under § 6011. See id. The Code defines reportable and listed
transactions as follows:
(1) Reportable transaction-The term "reportable transaction" means any transaction
with respect to which information is required to be included with a return or statement
because, as determined under regulations prescribed under section 6011, such
transaction is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax
avoidance or evasion.
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recognizes both listed and reportable transactions as transactions entered into
by taxpayers that the Treasury Department regard as being "substantially
similar" to a tax avoidance transaction, or, more broadly, has a "potential for
tax avoidance or evasion."
220
The Act also changed the statute of limitations requirements for listed
transactions. 221  The Act added a new paragraph to § 6501(c), the section
regarding fraudulent returns. 22  The new § 6501(c)(10) provides that the
limitations period for assessments of returns where the taxpayer fails to
disclose a listed transaction will not expire before one year after the earlier of
the date that either the taxpayer or his "material advisor" discloses information
223about the listed transaction. There were no changes to the statute of
limitations provisions in § 6501(e)(1)(A). z24 The Treasury Department has
identified the Son of Boss tax scheme and other similar transactions that use an
artificially high basis to generate non-economic losses as impermissible "listed
transaction[s] .225
(2) Listed transaction-The term "listed transaction" means a reportable transaction
which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by
the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of section 6011.
Id. § (c)(l)-(2); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
4520, "THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004" 151 (Comm. Print 2004) ("[T]he proposal
authorizes the Treasury Department to define a 'listed transaction' and a 'reportable transaction'
under section 6011 .").
220. I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(l)-(2). The Treasury Department has subsequently identified six
categories of reportable transactions: "(1) listed transactions; (2) confidential transactions; (3)
transactions with contractual protection; (4) loss transactions [a loss of at least $10 million in a
single year for individuals, or $20 million for corporations]; (5) transactions with a significant
book-tax difference; and (6) transactions involving a brief asset holding period." 26 C.F.R. §
1.6011-4(b) (2007).
221. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (Supp. V 2005).
222. Id.
223. See id The new limitations period for listed transactions provides:
If a taxpayer fails to include on any return or statement for any taxable year any
information with respect to a listed transaction (as defined in section 6707A(c)(2))
which is required under section 6011 to be included with such return or statement, the
time for assessment of any tax imposed by this title with respect to such transaction
shall not expire before the date which is 1 year after the earlier of-
(A)the date on which the Secretary is furnished the information so required, or
(B)the date that a material advisor meets the requirements of section 6112 with
respect to a request by the Secretary under section 6112(b) relating to such
transaction with respect to such taxpayer.
Id.
224. See I.R.C. § 6501(e).
225. See Notice 2000-44, supra note 16 ("Transactions that are the same as or substantially
similar to the transactions described in this Notice 2000-44 are identified as 'listed transactions'
for the purposes of § 1.601 l-4T(b)(2) of the Temporary Income Tax Regulations and § 301.6111 -
2T(b)(2) of the Temporary Procedure and Administration Regulations.").
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II. THE TROUBLING LEGACY OF COLONY
The Colony decision presents trial courts with a dilemma when they are
confronted with a § 6501(e)(1) limitations issue. Because of the nature of
complex tax avoidance schemes, IRS agents may take years before they realize
a taxpayer's participation in one. 226 As such, if a taxpayer reports at least some
income received from a non-listed transaction, under Colony's holding the
taxpayer could still use inflated basis to avoid disclosing his true capital gains
from the transaction. 227 Indeed, not long after Colony, courts expressed their
concern and disagreement with the seemingly obvious loophole that the
228Supreme Court fashioned. Unsure as to the clarity of the interpretive
mandate the Supreme Court handed down, courts began to look for ways to
narrow Colony's holding. 229  Judge Allegra articulated the problem in
Grapevine Imports: "[i]n the wake of Colony, a judicial debate erupted over
whether the 1954 version of section 6501(e)(1)(A) is triggered only where an
item of income is entirely omitted from a return." 30 With the recent surge in
Son of Boss cases, this problem has gained renewed attention.
After Colony, federal courts declined to expressly adopt the approach to §
6501(e) that some courts used before Colony, in which overstated basis was
231regarded as an omission of income. Instead, federal courts tried to
distinguish Colony and, when appropriate, gave the IRS the extended
limitations period through § 6501(e)(1)'s other two provisions, the gross
receipts and adequate disclosure tests.
A. Extending the Limitations Period Because of a Return's Failure to
Adequately Disclose the Nature of the Transaction
Generally, courts have construed § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s "adequate disclosure
standard ' 233 as providing a tougher requirement for the taxpayer to overcome
226. See Sheppard, supra note 3, at 462.
227. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
228. See, e.g., CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 406 & n.2 (1st
Cir. 2001) ("Whether Colony's main holding carries over to section 6501(e)(1) is at least
doubtful.").
229. See, e.g., id. at 407-08 ("On its face, the 'adequate to apprise the secretary of the nature
and amount' language establishes a much stiffer test than a mere clue, and quite properly the
cases tend to interpret it as requiring far more than a mere clue that might intrigue Sherlock
Holmes.").
230. Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 509 (2007).
231. See supra Part I.B.1.
232. See, e.g., CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d at 406 (distinguishing Colony's
substantial omission test).
233. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(l)(A)(ii) (2000) ("In determining the amount omitted from gross
income, there shall not be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income
stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the
return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of such item.").
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than is otherwise suggested by Colony's facial clue test.234  Courts have
developed several interpretive standards when applying Colony to § 6501(e)'s
adequate disclosure test.235 First, courts hold that Justice Harlan's reference to
a "clue" establishes a minimum requirement that sufficient information be
provided in the return; adequate disclosure does not require a "glaring[ red]
flag., 236 Rather, the extent of disclosure only has to be "merely one which
would tip off a careful examining agent as to the existence of error."237 Other
courts have described the standard as establishing a "much stiffer test than a
mere clue," 238 requiring more than a "clue ... sufficient to intrigue a Sherlock
Holmes." 239 At the same, the taxpayer need not provide a "detailed revelation
of each and every underlying fact.
24°
In tax shelter cases involving inflated basis, courts look to similar factors in
determining whether returns provide sufficient information to meet the
disclosure requirements. For example, in Western Limited Partnership, the
court concluded that the provision required Trammell Crow to disclose the
debt payment. 24  In Brandon Ridge Partners, the court held that in order to
satisfy the disclosure standard, the returns should disclose the partnership's
assumption of "the obligation to cover the short sale[s]," and that the partners'
234. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958) ("We think that in enacting §
275(c) Congress manifested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two
years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report some
taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors. In such instances
the return on its face provides no clue to the existence of the omitted item." (emphasis added));
see also Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL
2209129, at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) ("[T]he court finds that the gain on the sale of the FES
stock was not shown in a manner sufficient to enable the IRS, upon reasonable inspection, to
detect that it had been calculated incorrectly due to an overstatement in the basis of the stock,
which led to an understatement of gross income by over $3 million.").
235. See, e.g., CC & F W Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d at 408 ("In the end, the safe
harbor provision of section 6501 has to be read in light of its purpose, namely, to give the
taxpayer the shorter limitations period where the taxpayer omitted a particular income item from
its calculation but disclosed it in substance."); Taylor v. United States, 417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th
Cir. 1969) ("As Congress recognized, the Government cannot be required to act promptly on
information that is not known to it."); Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968)
("It seems here that there can be no substantial argument that the disclosure made by the bank's
return was 'adequate to apprise the Secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount of such
item."').
236. See Cardinal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 387, 393 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd,
425 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Benderoff v. United States, 398 F.2d 132, 136 (8th Cir.
1968) ("The proper test thus appears to be whether the return provides a clue as to the omitted
item.").
237. Cardinal Life Ins. Co., 300 F. Supp. at 393; see also Quick's Trust v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.
1336, 1347 (1970) ("Nothing in the statute requires disclosure of the exact amount." (citing
Cardinal Life Ins. Co., 300 F. Supp at 393.)).
238. CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d at 407.
239. Quick's Trust, 54 T.C. at 1347.
240. id.
241. CC& F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d at 408.
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"took the position that the assumption did not reduce their basis in their
interests in the partnership. 242
Courts have also developed different approaches to the scope of § 650 1(e)'s
adequate disclosure test. Some courts regard the disclosure provision as
providing a "safe harbor" for taxpayers who otherwise were found to have
omitted income. 243  However, other courts have interpreted the adequate
disclosure provision as providin an independent test for determining whether
an omission of income occurred. 44
In the Fifth Circuit's construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) in Phinney, the court
reasoned by negative implication that a return's failure to adequately disclose
an amount of income will constitute an omission of income.245 That is, an item
of income will be held to be omitted from the return if it is disclosed in the
return or an attached statement, but it is "not shown in a manner sufficient to
enable the secretary by reasonable inspection of the return to detect the
errors.' 246 Thus, independent of Colony's requirement that an item of income
be completely left out of a return, under the Fifth Circuit's rationale, an
omission will also occur when a return "misstat[es] ... the nature of an item of
income which places the 'commissioner . . . at a special disadvantage in
detecting errors."' 247  The six-year limitations period provided by §
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) is justified because the government ought not be "penalized
by a taxpayer's failure to reveal the facts."
' 24 8
Under the court's construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) in Phinney, the
adequate disclosure provision can be seen as far more than simply a "safe
harbor" for taxpayers who have omitted income. Instead, the disclosure
provision provides another tool for courts to use against tax evaders in the
ongoing "substance versus form" debate.
249
To the extent that this approach is used to give effect to the taxpayer's self-
reporting responsibilities, the purpose behind the adequate disclosure provision
complements the economic substance doctrine. For example, according to the
242. Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL
2209129, at *10, 12 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007); see also Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79
Fed. Cl. 189, 203 (2007) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the income was sufficiently reported
where plaintiff reported the gross receipts of the sale).
243. See, e.g., Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 204 ("Plaintiffs therefore may not take
advantage of the safe harbor afforded by the adequate disclosure provision of I.R.C. §
6501 (e)(l)(A)(ii).").
244. See, e.g., Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7 (explaining that under the
Fifth Circuit, "an item of income is omitted if the item is not shown in a manner sufficient to
enable the IRS, upon reasonable inspection, to detect the error") (citing Taylor v. United States,
417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1969)).
245. Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968).
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958)).
248. Taylor v. United States, 417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1969).
249. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the different views of substance versus form.
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economic substance doctrine, even though a taxpayer complied with the
formalities of the tax code, a tax loss will be disallowed where the sole purpose
behind the loss-generating transaction is tax avoidance.250  By contrast, the
adequate disclosure provision provides courts with a mechanism to grant the
Commissioner the extended limitations period where the taxpayer fails to
comply with the code's formalities.25 1  Both require courts to consider the
nature or substance of the transaction itself.
2
B. Limiting Colony to Sales of Goods from Trade or Businesses
Courts have also applied the first prong of § 6501(e)(1)(A), the "gross
receipts test," so as to specifically limit Colony's holding to omissions of
income derived only from the sale of goods or services by trades or
businesses. 3 In general, courts applying this approach see the definition of
gross income from the sale of goods or services by a trade or business in §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) as the "gross receipts alone from those sales," however, §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) does not take basis into account.2 54 As such, it is an exception
to § 6501(e)(1)(A), to which courts apply § 61's general definition of gross
income.255 These courts emphasize that in Colony the Supreme Court was only
determining what constituted an omission under § 275(c) of the 1939 Tax
Code, which did not contain the definition of gross income found in §
2566501(e)(1)(A)(i) of the 1954 Code. They maintain that Congress reconciled
250. See I.R.C. § 6707A(l) (2000) (requiring a reporting statement for any transaction the
Secretary determines could be used for tax evasion).
251. Phinney, 392 F.2d at 685.
252. See supra notes 17, 236. Under the adequate disclosure provision, courts look to see if
the taxpayer disclosed sufficient information about the nature of the transaction so as to alert the
Commissioner to the fact of the transaction's existence. See Brandon Ridge Partners v. United
States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
Whereas the economic substance doctrine provides courts with an opportunity to evaluate the
legitimacy of the transaction itself. See supra note 17.
The decisions in Bakersfield and Grapevine are disappointing to the extent that the courts did
not discuss whether the deficiency notices could be made timely by applying the adequate
disclosure standard. Even if the courts correctly concluded that Colony should not be limited to
the trade or business exception, a different result might still have been reached if the courts had
analyzed the returns under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the adequate disclosure standard.
See Grapevine Imps. Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 512 n. 10 (2007) (finding that because
the extended limitations period is inapplicable under Colony's treatment of overstated basis, "this
court need not consider whether plaintiffs' various returns adequately disclosed features of the
various transactions so as to trigger the safety-valve provision of section 6501(e)(I)(A)(ii)");
Bakersfield Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 215 (2007).
253. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
254. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 199 (2007).
255. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
256. See, e.g., Schneider v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032, 1035 (1985) ("In applying
section 275(c), a conflict arose over what was meant by the term gross income when dealing with
trade or business gross income. The courts had to choose between using 'gross receipts' or 'gross
profits."').
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the matter in the passage of the new Tax Code in 1954, and point to the new
Code's legislative history to buttress these arguments.
257
Courts provide additional support for limiting the rationale in Colony to §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) by highlighting Congress's specific use of "items" when
describing an omission for estate and gift tax purposes. 258 This suggests that
the extended limitations period in § 6501(e)(2) is specifically applicable only
where an item of reportable income is totally left out.259  By contrast, the
broader reference to "an amount" in § 6501(e)(1)(A) is applicable both where
an item of income is left out and where there is an error in reporting gross
income because of an understatement of capital gains.
260
The more persuasive argument is that Colony's gross receipts test should
only apply to § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)'s trade or business income derived from sales
of goods or services and not to the Tax Code's general definition of income in
§ 61 because such an expansion of Colony's holding renders § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)
surplusage. 261 In other words, there is simply no point to § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) if
the phrase "omits from gross income," as used in § 6501(e)(1)(A),
encompasses § 61's general definition of gross income as well as gross income
from the sale of goods in a trade or business.
257. See supra note 184.
258. See Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL
2209129, at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) (distinguishing Congress's differing uses of"amount"
and "item"); see also Grapevine Imps. Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 510 n.7 (2007)
("[S]ection 6501(e)[(2)] ... provides a rule covering estate and gift taxes, corresponding to the
income tax rule. That paragraph, however, unlike section 6501(e)(1)(A), specifically refers to the
omission of 'items' includible in the gross estate or total gifts, apparently to make clear that the
six-year period was not to apply because of differences as to the valuation of property.... [T]he
presence of the words 'items' in paragraph (2) suggests that word ought not be implied into
section 6501(e)(1)(A), as the latter refers only generally to omissions of 'an amount' from 'gross
income."'). However, the court in Grapevine concluded that neither the additions of §§
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) or (ii) altered Colony's construction of§ 6501(e)(l)(A). See id.
259. See Grapevine Imps., 77 Fed. Cl. at 510 n.7.
260. See Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7.
261. See Grapevine Imps., 77 Fed. Cl. at 510 n.7. Judge Allegra indicates his support of the
surplusage reasoning in a footnote in Grapevine:
To conclude, as plaintiffs do, that the Colony gross receipts test applies, under section
6501(e)(1), to every sort of sale is to render surplusage Congress'[s] reference to that
same test as applying "[i]n the case of a trade or business." That result, however,
would violate the canon that "a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous
words."
Id.; see also CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 406 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Whether Colony's main holding carries over to section 6501(e)(1) is at least doubtful. That
section's first 'special rule' adopts Justice Harlan's gross receipts test but only for sales of goods
or services. The arguable implication is that it does not apply under section 6501 to other types of
income." (citations omitted)); Lawson v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M (CCH) 3121, 3121-24 (1994) ("This
special definition of 'gross income' was limited to interpretations of section 6501(e) and was not
intended to be applied outside of that section unless the Code otherwise provided.").
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III. SECTION 6501(c)(10)'s NEW LIMITATIONS PERIOD FAILS TO RESOLVE THE
QUESTION OF OVERSTATED BASIS CREATED BY COLONY
As part of its response to the use of partnerships in tax shelters in the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress added § 6501 (c)(10) to the Tax
Code.262  This addition prevents a taxpayer who has not disclosed his
participation in an impermissible tax transaction from pleading the statute of
limitations bar under § 6501(a). 63 However, this new limitations period
applies only to taxpayers who fail to disclose their participation in a transaction
specifically identified by the Treasury Department as a listed transaction.
264
Thus, a problem presented by § 6501(c)(10)'s narrow focus is its
inapplicability to litigation involving tax transactions that are not otherwise
identified as listed transactions. If a taxpayer in such a suit challenged the
enforceability of a deficiency notice based on the I.R.C.'s statute of limitations,
the outcome would likely turn on the applicability of § 6501(e)(1)(A), which
265Congress left unchanged. Unfortunately, Congress has also left unresolved
the lingering judicial debate over whether the Supreme Court's holding in
Colony precludes treating overstated basis that produces understated gain as an
omission of income under § 6501(e)(1)(A). This question is especially
pertinent to litigation involving tax shelters or other tax avoidance schemes,
where the tax returns are just short of being deemed evasive or fraudulent by
the IRS.267
The facts in Phinney v. Chambers provide a good illustration of this
problem.268  In Phinney, the taxpayer's return accurately reported gross
262. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (Supp. V 2005).
263. See id.
264. See id. (providing that the statute of limitations period is extended, "[i]f a taxpayer fails
to include on any return or statement any information with respect to a listed transaction"). In
one sense, the new limitations period is more generous than its counterpart in § 6501(a). If a
taxpayer meets the rigorous disclosure requirements of § 6501(c)(10), then the IRS has only a
year to issue a deficiency notice to the taxpayer. See id. ("[T]he time for assessment of any tax
imposed by this title with respect to such transaction shall not expire before the date which is I
year after the earlier of' two occurrences.). On the contrary, § 6501(a) provides the IRS a
minimum of three years to issue a deficiency notice. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) ("[T]he amount of any
tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed .... ").
265. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (making no change to I.R.C. § 6501 (e)(1)(A)).
266. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 33 (1958).
267. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United
States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007) (No. 06-503 T) ("Although their use of the Son of Boss tax shelter
resulted in the omission of $4,567,946 of income, the partners' returns give no indication that any
shelter transaction was involved at all. At best, their reporting was sloppy, incomplete, and
misleading. At worst, it was designed to deceive. Either way, the partners failed to honor their
self-reporting responsibility.").
268. Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1968).
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receipts from the sale of stock. 269 However, the stock's reported basis was an
erroneously inflated amount that resulted in a reported gain of zero.27 ° Today,
hypothetically, if the taxpayer in Phinney were to file a summary judgment
motion before a court asserting that the IRS's deficiency notice is
unenforceable because it was not timely issued, which statute of limitations
period should the court apply: § 6501(c)(10)'s or § 6501(a)'s?
Because the taxpayer in Phinney was not alleged to have participated in a
271listed transaction or even a tax shelter, § 6501(c)(10) would not apply.
Thus, the timeliness of the deficiency notice's issuance must be resolved by the
Tax Code's standard statute of limitations period contained in § 6501(a) unless
the extended limitations period is applicable under § 6501(e). 272 To qualify for
§ 6501(e)'s extended statute of limitations the IRS must show that the taxpayer
omitted more than 25% of gross income stated in the return.273 To do so, the
IRS and (until recently) the Tax Court would have trial courts treat gain or
other income that is understated as a result of overstated basis as a substantial
274omission of income under § 6501(e)(1)(A), whereas the Supreme Court in
Colony clearly suggests that overstated basis may not be considered in
calculating substantially omitted income.275 Which version should a reviewing
court accept? In spite of Congress's recent efforts, the possibility remains that
courts must continue their attempts to square § 6501(e) with Colony's
treatment of overstated basis. If Dr. Watson had drafted § 6501(c)(10),
Sherlock Holmes would undoubtedly tell him to dig deeper.
A. Congress Should Amend § 6501 (e)(1)(A)
Unless the Supreme Court revisits Colony to determine its viability in an era
of complex tax shelters, courts will continue to struggle with this uncertainty.
Therefore, Congress should amend § 6501(e)(1)(A) to ensure uniform
269. See id at 682-83.
270. See id. at 682.
271. Seeid. at683.
272. See I.R.C. §§ 6501(a), (e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
273. See id. § 650 1(e)(l)(A) ("If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly
includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the
return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed.").
274. See, e.g., Estate of Fry v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1020, 1022 (1987) (finding the taxpayer's
disclosure insufficient); Insulglass Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 203, 210 (1985) (holding that the
six-year limitations applied where taxpayer failed to disclose more than 25% of gross income);
Schneider v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032, 1035 (1985) (applying the six-year statute of
limitations).
275. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958) (construing the predecessor to §
6501(e)(1)(A) as applicable only to "the specific situation where a taxpayer actually omitted some
income receipt or accrual in his computation of gross income, and not more generally to errors in
that computation arising from other causes").
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treatment of what constitutes an "omission of gross income." Congress has
several effective options from which to choose.
First, Congress can clarify the meaning of "omits from gross income" as
stated in § 6501(e)(1)(A). This can be done by clearly stating that an omission
can occur either where an item of income is left out of a return, or when errors
occur due to overstated basis. This could also be done by stating that "gross
income" is to be defined according to § 61. Under either method, a return that
reports understated gain because of overstated basis would result in an
"omission from gross income. ' 276
Of the three possible Congressional remedies, this is the most preferable. It
would go a long way toward further strengthening the Tax Code's anti-abuse
provisions by eliminating the ability of taxpayers who enter into non-listed
transactions that use inflated basis to offset gains to plead the limitations bar.
277
This option also has the added benefit of resolving the current inconsistency
among courts over the proper application of Colony to the 1954 Code.278
Second, Congress could narrowly define "sale of goods and services" as
stated in § 6501(e)(l)(A)(i) to mean income from inventory or gross receipts
income, and not § 61 income. This has the benefit of curing courts' surplusage
concerns by clarifying that § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) is exclusively an exception to
the general rule of § 6501(e)(1)(A). This would also finally settle the
discussion about the scope of Colony's holding, limiting it to taxpayers who
are "engaged in a trade or business selling good or services where the taxpayer
'omitted some income receipt or accrual in his computation of gross
income.'279
Third, Congress could alternatively adopt the narrow construction of Colony,
advocated by many Son of Boss plaintiffs, that an "omission from gross
income" can only occur under § 6501(e)(1)(A) when an item of income is
280completely left out of a return. This is the least preferable course of action
276. See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. CI. 189, 200 (2007).
277. This is assuming the deficiency notice is mailed within § 6501(e)(i)'s six-year period.
But see Grapevine Imps. Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 512 (2007) (noting that "it is far
from evident that every sort of significant understatement of gross income ought to trigger a six-
year statute of limitations").
278. See supra note 34.
279. Salman Ranch, 79 Fed. Cl. at 200 (quoting Colony, 357 U.S. at 33).
280. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 32 (contemplating that the term omit may mean completely left
out). That more than fifty years have passed since the Colony decision would seem to suggest
Congress concurred with Justice Harlan's statement that Colony is in "harmony" with the 1954
Code. That Congress chose to ignore the limitations provisions in § 6501(e) and instead focused
on § 6501(c) when it enacted tax shelter reforms in the American Jobs Creation Act also supports
this view. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811, 118 Stat. 1418,
1575-77, 1581 (codified as amended in I.R.C. §§ 6707A, 6501 (2004)). However, these
arguments are offset by the corresponding congressional inaction while courts narrowed Colony's
applicability to its facts. Such a broad construction of Colony's holding has been squarely
rejected by courts that have addressed this question. See supra Part 1.B.2. for a discussion of
court decisions limiting Colony to its holding.
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for Congress to take. It would codify a construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A) that
has been disputed by courts ever since the Colony decision. It would render §
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) surplussage by making that provision's special definition of
"gross income" indistinguishable from "gross income" as used in §
6501(e)(1)(A). More importantly, it would codify a gaping hole in the code's
limitations provisions, allowing taxpayers to enter into transactions that "put
the Commissioner at a special disadvantage in detecting errors in the
return.' '281 Moreover, this would run contrary to Congress's recent efforts to
strengthen the code's anti-tax shelter provisions.
B. A Rational Approach to Colony
Congress did not amend the Tax Code retrospectively to affect the outcome
of the remaining 750 cases that the IRS has identified as Son of Boss
transactions where the taxpayers did not participate in the voluntary disclosure
282settlement offer. These cases are currently being litigated and courts must
apply the 1986 Tax Code prior to its amendment under the American Jobs
Creation Act.283  The problem is that lower courts are split on whether
Colony's holding bars enforcing deficiency notices sent to Son of Boss
participants after § 6501(a)'s statute of limitations expired.284
For those courts litigating § 6501(e)(1) under Colony, the Fifth Circuit's
construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s adequate disclosure standard provides an
independent method for determining whether an omission of income has
occurred when a return "misstate[es] ... the nature of an item of income."
285
Courts citing § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) correctly note that Congress's concern was
whether the taxpayer's return provided the IRS with sufficient information
about the "substance" of the transaction, notwithstanding errors in calculation
or other mistakes in the return.
286
When faced with Son of Boss transactions, recent courts have looked to
whether a tax return discloses any pertinent obligations by partners or• • 287
partnerships to cover the liabilities from the underlying transaction. For
281. Colony, 357 U.S. at 36.
282. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 814(b), 118 Stat. 1418,
1581 ("Effective Date.-The amendment made by this section shall apply to taxable years with
respect to which the period for assessing a deficiency did not expire before the date of the
enactment of this Act."). See also supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007
WL 2209129, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed.
C1. 505, 506 (2007); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207 (2007).
284. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *4-8; Grapevine Imps., 77 Fed. Cl. at
510-13.
285. Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968).
286. See, e.g., CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 407 (tst Cir.
2001).
287. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *9-11; see also Salman Ranch Ltd. v.
United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 202-03 (2007).
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example, in a federal district case reviewing Son of Boss transactions
involving a partner's transfer of recently purchased call options to the
partnership, critical factors include whether the return disclosed the transfer of
the options to the partnership, any obligations or liabilities from the transfer of
the option, and the transfer's effect on the basis of the partnership.28 8 A return
that withholds such information fails to adequately disclose the substance of
the transaction, and would constitute an omission of income under the Fifth
Circuit's construction of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).289 Assuming the omission
exceeds 25% of the amount of gross income stated in the return, "an extended
limitations period is warranted in order for the IRS 'not to be penalized by a
taxpayer's failure to reveal the facts,' because the IRS 'cannot be required to
act promptly on information that is not known to it.
''29°
The facts of Colony tend to support this construction. At the outset of his
opinion in Colony, Justice Harlan noted that there was no allegation of fraud or
deception made against the taxpayer.291 There, the taxpayer inflated the basis
of real estate lots by erroneously including legitimate development costs that
the IRS later determined to be impermissible for calculating basis. 292 This
activity is far different from the modem tax shelter practice of intentionally
inflating basis in order to generate artificial losses. Indeed, given that Colony
was decided in 1958, well before courts took notice of the development of the
tax shelter industry, it is hard to imagine that Justice Harlan would approve of
his construction of the 1939 Tax Code being used to justify imposing the
shorter limitations period to such schemes.
This suggests that Colony's holding, properly construed, should be viewed
as applicable to situations where a transaction is honestly reported as an
alternative approach. Therefore, applying the rationale of the economic
substance doctrine to the adequate disclosure provision, understated gain
should be treated as omitted income when there is evidence of a deliberate
misstatement of basis. This is buttressed by Congress's effort to prevent
participants in tax shelters from pleading the limitations bar provided in recent
tax shelter reforms.
293
In the absence of congressional action, for courts litigating § 6501(e)(1)
under Colony, the Fifth Circuit's robust interpretation of the adequate
disclosure standard provides another "judicial tool for effectuating the
underlying Congressional purpose" behind the statute of limitations.294 That
288. Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *10-11.
289. See id.
290. Id. at * 10 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1969)).
291. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 30 (1958) ("There was no claim that the
taxpayer had inaccurately reported its gross receipts .... There was no claim that the returns
were fraudulent.").
292. Id
293. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
294. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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purpose is "to give the taxpayer the shorter limitations period where the




The courts and the IRS have largely succeeded in their efforts to end the Son
of Boss tax shelter and other variant tax avoidance schemes on grounds that
these transactions lack economic substance. However, in an effort to continue
benefiting from their participation in these transactions, many taxpayers are
hoping that courts will find that the Tax Code's statute of limitations bars
enforcement of their deficiency notices. These taxpayers maintain that the
Supreme Court's holding in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner stands for the
proposition that overstated basis that produces understated gain may never
constitute an omission of gross income under § 6501(e)(1)(A). The judiciary is
currently divided on the applicability of Colony to the modem Tax Code. The
American Jobs Creation Act leaves unanswered the question of whether
overstated basis may result in omitted income. Consequently, courts must
litigate the remaining Son of Boss cases and other similar cases not resolved by
the new regulations regime subject to the Supreme Court's holding in Colony.
The best solution to this problem is for Congress to amend § 6501(e)(1)(A) to
state that overstated basis that results in understated gain qualifies as an
omission of gross income.
295. CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 408 (1st Cir. 2001).
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